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WALKING THE LINE OF ADMISSIBILI1Y: WHY MARYLAND
COURTS SHOULD REEXAMINE THE ADMISSIBILI1Y OF FIELD
SOBRIE1Y TESTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In what was one of the earliest reported instances involving expert
testimony, a Dr. Brown of Norwich took the stand in 1665. 1 Dr.
Brown offered the expert scientific opinion that the accused women
were witches and, by practicing their witchcraft, they had bewitched
many children. 2 There was no challenge as to the validity of the expert scientific testimony, and the defendants were found guilty and
hanged. 3 In 2005, witchcraft is no longer the problem facing American society that it was in the 1660's. Still, scientific testimony, albeit
more sophisticated than that mentioned above, is an important tool
relied upon by courts to combat society's problems, including driving
under the influence of alcohol.
An estimated thirty percent of Americans will be involved in an alcohol- related automobile accident at some point in their lives. 4 According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA"), almost 18,000 citizens per year, or nearly fifty people per
day, are killed as a result of accidents involving impaired drivers. 5
Aside from the cost in human life, the economic effects of such accidents are large as well, as the estimated cost to the public caused by
these crashes in 2000 was $114.7 billion. 6 In response to these statistics, every state has criminalized impaired driving. 7
In January of 2002, the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland decided United States v. Hom, a case in which the Federal
Rules of Evidence were applied to Maryland's drunk driving law. s Par1. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385 n.7, 391 A.2d 364,370 n.7 (1978) (citing A
Trial of Witches at Bury St. Edmonds, 6 Howell's State Trials 687, 697 (1665».
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Mothers Against Drunk Driving [hereinafter MADD], Drunk Driving in the
United States, at http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,3726,00.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). The MADD Web site cites a National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration study from the year 2000 as the source of this
information.
5. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Stop Impaired Driving, at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/ people/injury/alcohol! stopimpaired/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
6. See supra note 4.
7. The MADD Web site has a link that allows the reader to access the drunk
driving laws for a majority of states, which can be found at http://www3.
madd.org/laws/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
8. United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002).
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ticularly, these Rules were applied to the use of Standardized Field
Sobriety Tests and the admissibility of the results of these tests at tria1. 9
As a result of the holding of Horn, two approaches now exist governing the admissibility of field sobriety tests in Maryland, depending
upon whether the case is tried in federal or state court. 1O In order to
understand the existing dichotomy, it is essential to examine the historical development of the admissibility of scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge given in the form of expert testimony.
Part II of this comment will examine the two competing approaches
governing the reliability of scientific techniques and their admissibility
as evidence. Part III will discuss the three field sobriety tests that
make up the Standardized Field Sobriety Test battery. Part IV of this
comment illustrates the treatment by Maryland and federal courts of
testimony relating to the field sobriety tests under the applicable evidentiary standard. Finally, Parts V and VI will show that the federal
court was correct in its analysis of the field sobriety tests, and that
Maryland courts would be wise to reconsider taking judicial notice of
the reliability of the field sobriety tests.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

Maryland Law and the Frye/Reed Standard

In 1923, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia considered the admissibility of the testimony of an expert witness as to the
results of a systolic blood pressure deception test in Frye v. United
StatesY In affirming the trial court's ruling that the testimony was
inadmissible, the court of appeals established a common law doctrine
governing the admissibility of expert testimony regarding scientific
principles. 12 The court held:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de9. Id.
10. In Horn, the defendant was stopped at the entrance of the Anny facility at
Aberdeen Proving Ground, which is located in Maryland but subject to federal jurisdiction. See Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 532. The Federal Rules of
Evidence are applicable in cases tried under the Assimilative Crimes Act.
Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476,479 (4th Cir. 1958) (interpreting the
Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13).
11. 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The systolic blood pressure deception test was a primitive sort of polygraph examination, based on the premise that "conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt
of crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under examination" would result in a rise in the test subject's blood pressure. Id. at
1013.
12. Id. at 1014.
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duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs. 13
Simply put, the Frye court established a rule that expert testimony regarding scientific information would only be admissible if the method
used to deduce the information is established and generally accepted
within the particular scientific field in question.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the Frye approach in the
1978 case Reed v. State. 14 Reed addressed the trial court's admission of
voice identification testimony based on spectrogram analysis, commonly known as "voiceprints."15 The trial court ruled the analysis admissible after hearing testimony regarding the general validity and
reliability of this method of identification. 16
In determining the proper standard to analyze the admissibility of
scientific evidence, the Court of Appeals began its analysis by discussing the reliability of the techniques used to deduce such evidenceP
The court concluded that if the reliability of a technique cannot be
judicially noted, it must be demonstrated to the court before testimony based on this evidence can be introduced at trial. 18 Instead of
placing the determination of the "threshold question" regarding the
reliability of testimony within the discretion of each trial judge, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the standard from Frye v. United
States as the test to determine the reliability of a scientific technique. 19
Thus, according to the Reed Court, "if a new scientific technique's validity is in controversy in the relevant scientific community, or if it is
generally regarded as an experimental technique, then expert testi13. [d. Upholding the trial court's refusal to admit the test results, the court
stated that the "test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justifY the
courts in admitting expert testimony." [d.
14. 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364,367-68 (1978).
15. [d. at 375, 377, 391 A.2d at 364-66. The defendant in this case had been
convicted of "rape, unnatural and perverted sex acts, robbery, verbal
threats, and unlawful use of the telephone." [d. at 377, 391 A.2d at 365.
The convictions were based in part on the prosecution's use of spectrographic analysis and comparison of recorded phone conversations between
the victim and the defendant and voice exemplars of the defendant made
while he was in custody. [d. at 376, 391 A.2d at 365.
16. [d. at 377, 391 A.2d at 365.
17. [d. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367 (stating that "the validity and reliability of a
scientific technique may be so broadly and generally accepted in the scientific community that a trial court may take judicial notice of its reliability.").
18. [d. This demonstration will usually be done through testimony, but a court
can take notice of law journals, scientific journals, and other publications.
[d.
19. [d. at 381, 391 A.2d at 367-68 (quoting Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923» .
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mony based upon its validity cannot be admitted into evidence."2o If a
technique has gained acceptance in the scientific community, testimony regarding the results of the test using this technique may be
introduced into evidence only after the trial judge determines that the
proposed testimony will be helpful to the fact-finder, and the expert is
properly qualified. 21 The Reed Court held the results of these tests
inadmissible because of an existing disagreement in the scientific
community on the reliability of voiceprinting. 22
B.

Federal Law and the Rule 702/Daubert/Kumho Tires Standard

Until 1993, the standard in federal courts governing the admissibility of expert testimony deduced from the application of scientific techniques was the "general acceptance" test articulated in Frye v. United
States and adopted by Maryland courts in Reed v. State. 23 In that year,
however, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the interplay of the Frye general acceptance standard and the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 24 Because the Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye, any analysis of the Court's holding must begin
with an examination of the applicable rule. 25
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads in full:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 26
Because Rule 702 directly addressed the issue decided in Frye, the
Daubert Court reasoned:
Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of
a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention
20. Reed, 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368.
21. [d. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372.
22. [d. at 399-400, 391 A.2d at 377. The case was remanded for a new trial, but
the court pointed out that the holding would be subject to reconsideration
should "voiceprinting" become generally accepted in the scientific community subsequent to the ruling. [d.
23. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993). Before
articulating the new federal standard, the Court wrote that "[iJn the 70
years since its formulation in the Frye case, the 'general acceptance' test has
been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at triaL" [d.
24. [d. at 582-83, 586-87.
25. [d. at 587.
26. FED. R. EVlD. 702.
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"'general acceptance,''' the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made "general acceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific
testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be
applied in federal trials. 27
In other words, the Court held that Frye no longer applied in federal
cases.
Mter announcing its ruling in Daubert, the Court went step-by-step
through the new requirements that must be met for scientific evidence to be reliable in accordance with Rule 702.28 The first step of
analysis under Daubert is that the subject of the testifying expert's attestations must be "scientific."29 In order to qualifY as scientific knowledge, an inference or assertion must come from utilizing the scientific
method. 30 The second consideration a federal court must undertake
is whether the proposed testimony will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," or, simply put,
whether the testimony is relevantY
In determining whether these two considerations are met, the
Daubert Court gave a list of observations that may aid a trial judge. 32
The first factor on the Daubert "checklist" used to determine whether
the technique used by the expert is scientific is whether the technique
"can be (and has been) tested."33 Next, a trial court judge can consider whether the technique or theory has been subjected to peer review, either through publication or some other means. 34 The known
or potential error rate of the method should also be considered. 35
Finally, the Court stated that general acceptance can also be a factor
in this determination. 36 The Court summarized its analysis by stating
that a Rule 702 inquiry should be flexible, and that the focus should
27. 509 U.S. at 589. The "permissive backdrop" of the Rules referred to by the
Court refers to the liberal standard of relevance established by the Rules.
See id. at 587; see also FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
28. 509 U.S. at 589-95.
29. Id. at 589-90. The Court also acknowledged that under the language of the
Rule, "technical, or other specialized knowledge" also applies, but noted
that its discussion was limited to the scientific context. Id. at 590 n.8.
30. Id. at 590.
31. Id. at 591; see also FED. R. EVID. 702; U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242
(3d. Cir. 1985) (stating that "[a]n additional consideration under Rule
702-and another aspect of relevancy-is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the
jury in resolving a factual dispute").
32. 509 U.S. at 592-94. The Court noted that this "checklist" is not definitive.
Id. at 593.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 593-94.
35. Id. at 594.
36. Id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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be on principles and methodology, not the conclusions formed
therefrom. 37
To complete a Federal Rule of Evidence 702 analysis, one must next
look to Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 38 Here, the Supreme Court extended the standard articulated in Daubert to apply to testimony based
on "'technical' and 'other specialized knowledge,'" thereby expanding applicability of the doctrine over virtually all expert testimony.39 The Court then clarified the list of factors enunciated in
Daubert, noting that they may not apply "to all experts or in every
case."40 The Court further asserted that the trial court will have
"broad latitude" in deciding both how to determine reliability and ultimately deciding if this process is satisfied, thus making the testimony
reliable. 41 The Court concluded its holding in Kumho Tire by stating
that "Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority,
reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case."42
In order to understand how these competing approaches are applied in drunk driving cases, one must first become familiar with the
standardized field sobriety tests to which the above-mentioned evidentiary standards are applied.
III.

A.

THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS

The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test

Nystagmus describes an involuntary eye motion that can be exhibited in two ways.43 The first is "pendular nystagmus, where the eye
37. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95. At issue in Daubert was the admissibility of studies linking the drug Bendectin to birth defects. Id. at 582-85. Because the
lower courts had utilized the Frye "general acceptance" standard, the case
was remanded. Id. at 597-98.
38. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). At issue in Kumho was testimony by an expert in tire
failure analysis in a diversity suit involving a car accident. Id. at 142. Because the expert was not a scientist, there was an issue as to whether Daubert
applied. Id. at 141.
39. Id. at 141-42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
40. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42.
41. Id. at 142. The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding
how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special
briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether that expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Id.
at 152. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Daubert
factors).
42. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 158. The Court reversed the court of appeals' holding
that the trial judge had abused his discretion in acting as a reliability "gatekeeper." Id. at 145-46, 158. Therefore, the trial judge's conclusion that the
tire expert's testimony was unreliable and should be excluded was affirmed.
Id.
43. James J. Dietrich, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: The Science & the Law: A Resource Guide for Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcement, Section I, at http:/ /
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oscillates equally in two directions."44 The second is 'Jerk nystagmus,
where the eye moves slowly away from a fix[ed] point and then is rapidly corrected."45 Horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN") is a type ofjerk
nystagmus. 46
Alcohol consumption causes alcohol gaze nystagmus, which includes HGN. 47 When intoxicated, a person's smooth and accurate
control of his or her eye movements will break down. 48 The purpose
of the HGN test is twofold: (1) to "identify drivers with [blood alcohol
content] in the .08-.12 range that make up the bulk of the impaired
drivers who do not necessarily exhibit exaggerated characteristics of
impairment; and (2) [to] detect impairment in alcohol-tolerant drivers who may not display any gross coordination and balance
problems."49
The HGN test is administered by requiring a subject to follow an
object, "such as a pen or the tip of a penlight," with his or her eyes. 50
The administering officer will place the object above eye-level and
about twelve to fifteen inches from the subject's face. 51 Next, the officer instructs the subject of the test to follow the object with his or her
eyes only, and not move his or her head. 52 The officer then conducts
the test looking for three "clues" in each eye that HGN is present,
which would indicate impairment. 53 The clues are lack of smooth
pursuit,54 distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation,55 and angle of
onset of nystagmus prior to forty-five degrees. 56 If at least four clues

44.
45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
5l.
52.
53.
54.

55.

56.

www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/ enforce/ nystagmus/hgntxt.html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
Id.
Id. The study compares a normal eye to one with jerk nystagmus: "An eye
normally moves smoothly like a marble rolling over a glass plane, whereas
an eye with jerk nystagmus moves like a marble rolling across sandpaper."
Id.
Id.
Id. at Section II. Alcohol also causes positional alcohol nystagmus, which is
not included in the field sobriety tests, and therefore will not be discussed
further. Id.
Id.
Id. at Section III.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The officer slowly moves the object from the center of the subject's face
towards the left ear, watching to see if the left eye will follow smoothly or
exhibit nystagmus. Id. The process is then repeated with the right eye. Id.
Id. The officer again moves the object toward the left ear, this time pausing
at the point that the eye has gone as far to the side as possible. Id. The
officer will hold the object here for about four seconds, looking to see if
there is a "distinct and sustained nystagmus." Id. Again, the process is repeated with the right eye. Id.
Id. In this test, the "officer moves the object at a speed that would take
about four seconds" to go from the center of the face to the edge of the
subject's left shoulder. Id. If the eye begins to exhibit nystagmus before
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are present, it is likely that the subject has a blood alcohol content
("BAC") of at least .10. 57 The HGN test is regarded as the most "scientific" or "technical" of the field sobriety tests. 58

B.

The Walk and Turn Test

The second part of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test battery is
the Walk and Turn ("WAT") Test. 59 The WAT test is a "divided attention" test, which, according to the NHTSA, can be performed easily by
most unimpaired persons. 5O During the test, the subject is instructed
to take nine steps along a straight line in a heel-to-toe fashion. 61 Mter
completing this, the suspect must then pivot on one foot and do the
same in the opposite direction. 62 In the WAT test there are eight indicators of impairment: failing to maintain balance while listening to
instructions, beginning the test before the instructions are completed,
stopping during walking to maintain or regain balance, failing to walk
in a heel-to-toe manner, stepping off of the line, using arms for balance, making an improper turn, or taking an improper number of
steps.63 Research indicates that seventy-nine percent of those exhibiting two or more of the above indicators will have a BAC of .08 or
greater. 64
C.

The One-Leg Stand Test

The final test in the Standardized Field Sobriety Test trilogy is the
One-Leg Stand ("OLS") Test. 65 In this test, the subject must raise a
.. "

57.
58.
59.
60.

6l.
62.
63.

64.

65.

the object reaches approximately forty-five degrees from the center of the
face, a "clue" exists. Id. The process is repeated with the right eye. Id.
See U.S. v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530,536-37 (D. Md. 2002). According to
the manual, based on these test results, one would be able to correctly classify a suspect as intoxicated about seventy-seven percent of the time. Id.
See id.
See id. at 537.
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFE'IY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DEVELOPMENT OF A STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIE'IY TEST (SFST) TRAINING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DOT HS 809 400, Appendix A (Nov. 2001), available at http:/
/www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol!sfst/appendix_a.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). The One-Leg Stand test is also considered a divided
attention test. Id. The rationale behind these tests is that an impaired person is likely to have difficulty dividing attention between simple physical
and mental tasks. Id. See also infra notes 63-68 for discussion of the OneLeg Stand test.
See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFE'IY ADMIN., supra note 60, at Appendix A.
Id.
Id. The subject is also told to keep his arms at his side during the test. See
Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFE'IY ADMIN., supra note 60, at Appendix A (citingJAcK STUSTER & MARCELLINE BURNS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., VALIDATION
OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST BATTERY AT BACs BELOW 0.10
PERCENT (1998), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/
alcohol!Archive/Limit.08/!SFSTREP.PDF) (August 1998)).
Id.
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foot off of the ground approximately six inches and count out loud by
thousands. 66 The subject will have to maintain this position for thirty
seconds. 67 In this test, there are four indicators of impairment. 68
These indicators are "swaying while balancing, using arms to balance,
hopping to maintain balance, and putting the foot down" on the
ground. 69 Individuals exhibiting two or more of these indicators will,
according to the NHTSA, have a BAC of .08 or higher eighty-three
percent of the time. 70 When the results of the Standard Field Sobriety
Test are combined, the NHTSA states that officers accurately conclude a subject is intoxicated ninety-one percent of the time. 71 Obviously, the conclusions of the NHTSA alone are not enough to make
the tests admissible in impaired driving trial, and courts around the
country have approached the admissibility of the test results differently, coming to different conclusions as to their reliability.72
IV.

EVIDENTARY TREATMENT OF STANDARD FIELD SOBRIElY
TESTS UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL STANDARDS

A.

The Maryland Standard

In Crampton v. State,73 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
held that the trial judge did not err in admitting an arresting officer's
testimony regarding observations of a suspect's performance of field
sobriety tests. 74 The tests the defendant had to complete, however,
were not all part of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test battery discussed above. 75 The court limited the officer's testimony to telling the
jury that the defendant was unable to perform the tests and was
arrested. 76
In 1995, the Court of Special Appeals considered whether the Frye/
Reed standard must be satisfied in order for an officer's testimony re66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing STUSTER & BURNS, supra note 64).
71. Id. (citing STUSTER & BURNS, supra note 64). Accuracy increases to ninetyfour percent if explanations for false positives are included. Id. (citing
STUSTER & BURNS, supra note 64).
72. See infra Section IV and accompanying text.
73. 71 Md. App. 375, 525 A.2d 1087 (1987), aff'd, 314 Md. 265,550 A.2d 693
(1988).
74. Id. at 389,525 A.2d at 1094. The court ruled that the Frye/Reed standard did
not have to be satisfied, as the officer's testimony was based on "essentially
empirical observations, involving no controversial, new, or 'scientific' technique." Id. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1093-94.
75. Id. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1093. The tests the officer required the suspect to
complete were to "stand on one leg, recite the alphabet, and perform a
heel-ta-toe test." Id. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text for discussion of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test Battery.
76. Crampton, 71 Md. App. at 387,525 A.2d at 1093.
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garding an individual's performance on an HGN test to be admissible. 77 In Schultz v. State, the court ruled that a Frye/Reed foundation
was required for the HGN test to be admissible. 78 The Court stated
that "the HGN test, however, does not test a suspect's coordination or
ability to recollect. It is based upon a scientific principle that the extent and manner in which one's eye quivers can be a reliable measure
of the amount of alcohol one has consumed. "79
The court then stated, however, that the results of HGN tests would
be admissible without reference to the Frye/Reed standard, as the court
took judicial notice of the test's reliability and acceptance. 80 Under
Maryland law, a court may take judicial notice of a fact if it is "not
subject to reasonable dispute" and either "generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court," or "capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."81 The Schultz court used cases from other jurisdictions in taking judicial notice of the fact that the Standardized
Field Sobriety Tests are reliable. 82
The court's judicial notice was somewhat qualified, however, as the
State would still be required to show that the test was properly conducted and given by a qualified officer. 83 In 1999, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland further limited the doctrine by ruling that
HGN tests cannot be used as proof of a specific BAC. 84
77. Schultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145,664 A.2d 60 (1995).
78. Id. at 150-51, 664 A.2d at 62-63.
79. Id. at 156, 664 A.2d at 65.
80. [d. at 164-65, 664 A.2d at 69. The court stated: "We shall further hold,
however, that the results of HGN tests are, nevertheless, admissible in the
trial courts of this State without further reference to the Frye/Reed standard.
We take judicial notice of the reliability and acceptance of the HGN test."
Id. The court supported its holding that judicial notice can be taken in
regard to the reliability of HGN tests by discussing cases from other jurisdictions where HGN testing was found to be a reliable indicator of intoxication. See generally id. at 167-73, 664 A.2d at 71-74.
81. MD. R. 5-201 (b).
82. 106 Md. App. at 167-68, 664 A.2d at 71. The court stated:
Because the test is so frequently, even predominantly, used in a
forensic setting, however, there is another, equally reliable,
source-the holdings of other courts that have examined the
question .
. . . We can draw our own conclusions from the collection of holdings of our sister (or brother) courts, including those mat have
found a sufficient basis for taking judicial notice.
Id.
83. [d. at 174, 664 A.2d at 74. The court wrote, "We take judicial notice that the
results of HGN testing, if the test is properly given by a qualified officer, are
admissible to indicate the presence of alcohol in a defendant." Id. The
Court of Special Appeals ruled that the trial court erred in admitting the
officer's testimony in Schultz, as a sufficient foundation was not established
as to the officer's qualifications. Id. at 180, 664 A.2d at 77.
84. Wilson v. State, 124 Md. App. 543, 554-56, 723 A.2d 494, 499-500 (1999).
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The Federal Standard

The federal standard governing the admissibility of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests was articulated by Magistrate Paul Grimm in
United States v. Horn. 85 Magistrate Grimm first analyzed the admissibility of field sobriety tests as direct evidence of intoxication. 86 Like Maryland courts, Magistrate Grimm held that using only the results of the
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests is not enough to prove BAC levels. 87
The Horn analysis then turned to the question of whether the field
sobriety test battery can be used as circumstantial evidence of intoxication. 88 Similar to Maryland courts, Magistrate Grimm held that the
tests can be used as circumstantial evidence of intoxication as long as
they first meet the Rule 702 requirement of reliability as interpreted
in the Daubert /Kuhmo Tire analysis. 89 It is here that the holding in
Horn began to diverge from Maryland law. 90
Next, Magistrate Grimm concluded that "the Standardized Field Sobriety Test evidence in this case does not, at this time, meet the requirements of Daubert/Kumho Tire and Rule 702 as to be admissible as
direct evidence of intoxication or impairment."91 Alternatively stated,
the test cannot be used as direct evidence of a particular BAC, intoxication, or impairment in federal court.
Another example of Magistrate Grimm's divergence from Maryland
law is his treatment of the OLS and WAT tests. Like Maryland, Magistrate Grimm concluded that these two tests are merely "standardized
procedures" used to make objective observations of coordination,
speech, balance, concentration, ability to follow directions, physical
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002).
Id. at 556.
Id. See also supra note 83-84 and accompanying text.
Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
Id. at 557-58. See also Wilson, 124 Md. App. at 555, 723 A.2d at 499-500.
Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 557-58. Magistrate Grimm wrote:
The state courts overwhelmingly have concluded that the results of
SFSTs are admissible as circumstantial evidence of alcohol consumption but have offered little guidance about what exactly the
testirying officer may tell the fact finder about the SFSTs, their administration, and the performance of the suspect when doing
them. The possibilities range from simply describing the testswithout explaining the scientific or technical bases underlying
them or their claimed accuracy rates and describing only what the
officer observed when they were performed, absent any opinions
regarding whether the suspect "passed" or "failed" or assessment of
the degree of intoxication or impairment-to a full explanation of
the tests, their claimed accuracy, the number of "standardized
clues" the suspect missed, and an opinion that the suspect "failed"
the test-in short everything up to testimony about the specific
BAC of the driver.
Id. at 557. See also Wilson, 124 Md. App. at 554-55, 723 A.2d at 499-500.
91. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
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condition, and mood. 92 However, Magistrate Grimm's analysis went
further in limiting the admissibility of these tests. 93 Magistrate Grimm
turned to the Florida District Court of Appeals for guidance. 94 In
State v. Meador,95 the Florida court wrote:
While the psychomotor tests [OLS and WAT] are admissible,
we agree with defendants that any attempt to attach significance to defendants' performance on these exercises beyond
that attributable to any of the other observations of a defendant's conduct at the time of the arrest could be misleading
to the jury and thus tip the scales so that the danger of unfair
prejudice would outweigh its probative value. The likelihood of unfair prejudice does not outweigh the probative
value as long as the witnesses simply describe their
observations. 96
Building upon this reasoning, Magistrate Grimm held that, when offered as circumstantial evidence of alcohol ingestion, the probative
value of any of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests comes from their
nature as observations of behavior, and not scientific, technical, or
specialized knowledge. 97 Because of the nature of these tests, an officer's testimony is limited to describing the procedures used in administering the test and observations as to the defendant's
performance. 98 In order to use terms such as 'test,' 'standardized
clues,' 'pass' or 'fail,'" the test must satisfY the Rule 702/Daubert/
Kumho Tire standard; Magistrate Grimm concluded the test does not
presently meet this standard. 99
Magistrate Grimm based his decision on many factors. He held that
the evidence introduced by the defense in Horn as to the first two
Daubert/Kumho Tire factors-the methods used to develop the tests
and the error rates of the tests-leads to the conclusion that the test is
not satisfied. lOo Therefore, this evidence must be analyzed.
92. Id. at 558. Grimm wrote that "[iJf offered as circumstantial evidence of
alcohol intoxication or impairment, the probative value of the SFSTs derives from their basic nature as observations of human behavior, which is
not scientific, technical or specialized knowledge." Id. at 559. Cf Crampton,
supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
93. Like much of Magistrate Grimm's analysis, the underlying principle here is
in agreement with Maryland law. He, however, seems to be more thorough
in his discussion, thus resulting in a federal standard that is more restrictive
as to the admissible testimony from an arresting officer in a DWI/DUI case.
94. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
95. 674 So. 2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
96. Id. at 832.
97. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 559. Magistrate Grimm extended the Meador
court's approach to the psychomotor tests to all SFSTs, including the HGN
test. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. See also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
100. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
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The evidence showing the development of the tests was introduced
by industrial psychologistJoel P. Wiesen, Ph.D.lOl Dr. Wiesen testified
about the development of the tests by examining five reports discussing the sobriety exams. 102 The reports were as follows: a June 1977
report prepared for the NHTSA titled "Psychophysical Tests for OWl
Arrests" ("1977 Report");103 a March 1981 final report titled "Development and Field Test of Psychophysical Tests for OWl Arrest" ("1981
Report");104 a September 1983 field evaluation titled "Field Evaluation
of a Behavioral Test Battery for OWl," ("1983 Report");105 a November 1995 study of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests titled "A Colorado Validation Study of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST)
Battery," (the "1995 Report");106 and an undated study titled "A Florida Validation Study of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST)
Battery" ("Florida Report") .107
Dr. Wiesen was "highly critical" of the studies mentioned above. lOS
Six specific problems were cited with the 1977 Report. lOg Dr. Wiesen
also cited eight concerns with the 1981 Report,110 seven problems
with the 1983 Report,Ill five with the 1995 Report,1l2 and three with
101. [d. at 542. Dr. Wiesen had ten years experience working for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts developing civil service examinations and ten more
years as an independent consultant in test development and validation. !d.
His testimony is summarized in a table found at pages 542-43.
102. [d.
103. [d. at 535-36. The report was prepared by Marcelline Burns, Ph.D., who has
commonly been used by the prosecution as an expert in DWI/DUI cases,
and Herbert Moskowitz, Ph.D., both of the Southern California Research
Institute [hereinafter SCRI]. [d. at 535-36 & n.14.
104. [d. at 536. Dr. Burns and SCRI prepared this report for the NHTSA. [d.
105. [d. Theodore E. Anderson, Robert M. Schweitz and Monroe B. Snyder prepared this study. [d.
106. [d. The report was prepared by Dr. Burns and the Pitkin County (Colorado) Sheriffs Office and was funded by the NHTSA. [d.
107. [d. Dr. Burns and the Pinellas County (Florida) Sheriff's Office prepared
this report. [d.
108. [d. at 542.
109. [d. The problems cited were the following: 1) a chin rest was used in the
lab tests, which was not done in the field; 2) a single set of data was used,
artificially inflating scores; 3) the tests were not age and gender neutral; 4)
the lab tests were monitored to ensure they were correctly performed,
which was not done in the field; 5) scoring was not adjusted to reflect differences in results based on the time of day the HGN test was conducted;
and 6) the fact that "the study was not peer reviewed, and would not have
been accepted if offered." [d.
110. [d. They were as follows: 1) very high error rates; 2) no adjustment to reflect effects of time of day on HGN testing; 3) low test/retest reliability
rates; 4) testing officers not basing decisions on SFST results; 5) possible
bias; 6) fifty percent of suspects arrested had a BAC below legal limit; 7)
officers used in study were not representative of all officers; and 8) reports
that in the field some officers entirely forgot or ignored standardized procedures. [d.
Ill. [d. They were as follows: 1) the professional standards of the testing community were not met; 2) a failure to monitor data collection; 3) arrests
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the Florida Report. 11 3 Dr. Wiesen concluded, "[I]n light of the specific critiques above (which are not exhaustive), I can only conclude
that the field sobriety tests do not meet reasonable professional and
scientific standards."114
Dr. Wiesen's testimony casts serious doubt on the methods used in
the development of the tests. The testimony of another expert for the
defense discussed the error rates of the field sobriety tests. Analyzing
the same studies as Dr. Wiesen, Harold P. Brull, a licensed psychologist, observed that there was a "complete absence of evidence 'which
would allow one to predict a known error rate in the field. "'115 Brull
concluded that if the error rates of the field sobriety tests were known,
they "likely would have been unacceptable in real world situations."116
The testimony on the methods used to develop the field sobriety test
battery and the error rates of the tests led Magistrate Grimm to hold
that the tests were unreliable under a Daubm/Kumho Tire analysis for
proving a specific BAC. 117
Another key factor to Magistrate Grimm's holding was the possible
causes of HGN other than intoxication. II8 The Schultz court ruled
that, to offset the possible alternative explanations to HGN, the trial
court must ensure that "the proper precautions were taken or the
proper considerations were accounted for prior to the administration
of the test itself."119 Magistrate Grimm's holding in Hom, however,

112.

113.

114.
115.
116.
117.

lIS.

119.

made due to results of breath tests made it impossible to tell what the arresting decision was based upon; 4) a failure to report twenty-five percent
of the data; 5) no statistical tests were performed on the data; 6) the tests
were not administered in standard fashion; and 7) the accuracy of the data
was suspect. Id.
Id. They were as follows: 1) the report was too incomplete to draw conclusions on the test's validity; 2) sections of the report were missing; 3) possible bias; 4) no monitoring of data collection; and 5) unclear results based
on two different arrest standards. Id.
Id. They were as follows: 1) the report was incomplete; 2) the methodology
was not described in the report; and 3) the data was incompletely described. Id.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 544.
[d. at 556. Magistrate Grimm reached this conclusion without considering
peer review of the tests or acceptance in an unbiased, relevant technical or
scientific community. Id. He noted, however, that the tests would fail even
if these factors were also considered. Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 555-56. The Hom decision refers to the Schultz court, which listed 3S
possible causes of HGN besides alcohol. Id. at 555-56 & n.45. See also Schultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145, IS0-81, 664 A.2d 60,77 (1995). A few of
these causes would seemingly be common amongst the general population,
including: influenza, eye strain, eye muscle fatigue, excessive consumption
of caffeine or exposure to nicotine, aspirin, some prescription drugs, heredity, antihistamine use, and diet. Id.
106 Md. App. at ISO, 664 A.2d at 77.
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provides defendants with the opportunity to make the finder of fact
aware of these alternate causes. 120
V.

MARYLAND'S FLAWED APPROACH TO STANDARDIZED
FIELD SOBRIE1Y TESTS

In the famous speech "The Path of the Law," Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes said:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past. 121
While Justice Holmes was certainly speaking before the time of enforcement of drunk driving laws and field sobriety tests, Maryland
courts would be well-served to pay heed to Holmes's principle in their
treatment of the admissibility of the results of the Standardized Field
Sobriety Tests. In taking judicial notice of the reliability of HGN testing, Maryland courts are guilty of perpetuating what other courts have
sought to avoid. For instance, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico
commented that the district court is required to "conduct a searching,
de novo inquiry into the validity of the HGN FST (Field Sobriety
Test), not to merely rubber stamp the decisions of courts in other
jurisdictions that have admitted such evidence."122 This approach to
the issue was not followed in Schultz v. State. 123 Because Magistrate
Grimm conducted a more thorough, thoughtful analysis than Maryland state courts have, his opinion is persuasive, and his conclusions
are indeed the correct ones.

A.

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland Erred
Notice of the Reliability of the Tests

tn

Taking Judicial

United States v. Horn revealed a plethora of evidence and testimony
that indicate that the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests are simply not
reliable indicators of intoxication. 124 Maryland courts, however, have
120. 185 F. Supp. 2d at 561. Under Hom, the government may prove a connection between exaggerated HGN and intoxication in three ways: "asking the
court to take judicial notice of it," elicitation of testimony of a qualified
expert, or through submission of learned treatises. [d. Defendants, in tum,
may prove there are other causes of HGN with the same tools available to
the government'llus the additional tool of cross-examining the government's expert. [, .
121. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address before the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8,1897), in 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). At
the time of this speech, Mr. Justice Holmes was a judge on the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
122. State v. Lasworth, 42 P.3d 844, 850 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
123. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text.
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either dismissed these factors or have completely failed to consider
them when deciding the reliability of the tests. In Schultz, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland wrote:

As we have attempted to show, the great weight of scientific literature supports its reliability and the majority of jurisdictions around the country have declared HGN testing to
be reliable. We take judicial notice that the results of HGN
testing, if the test is properly given by a qualified officer, are
admissible to indicate the presence of alcohol in a
defendant. 125
In deciding to take judicial notice if the reliability and acceptance of
the test, the court wrote, "We perceive that the studies, scientific articles, foreign cases, and other literature on the subject that we have
reviewed reveal that most courts and scientific authorities have held
the tests reliable if properly administered."126 The court, however,
failed to mention the studies, scientific articles, and other literature it
examined in reaching this conclusion, seemingly basing its holding on
the research already done by other courts that Maryland chose to fol10w. 127 This approach leaves open the possibility that unreliable testimony will be presented to the finder of fact.
Unlike the Maryland courts, Magistrate Grimm thoroughly examined all of the relevant scientific data presented by the parties in
Horn before reaching his conclusion. 128 This difference may be based
in part upon the two different evidentiary approaches utilized by the
respective courts. Magistrate Grimm observed:
Daubert requires analysis of the methodology used, its reliability and validity. Frye, on the other hand, may tempt a court
faced with determining the admissibility simply to see what
other courts have done in the past, as well as review publications supplied by the parties, or found by the court's own
efforts, without engaging in the sometimes difficult analysis
of the reliability of the science or technology underlying
those sources. 129

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland merely looked at what
other courts employing the Frye standard had ruled regarding field
sobriety tests, and followed the holding of those courts instead of independently evaluating the tests and their reliability.130
The Court of Special Appeals also considered the practical effects of
taking judicial notice of the reliability of the tests. The court wrote:
125.
126.
127.
128.

106 Md. App. 145, 174,664 A.2d 60, 74 (1995).
Id. at 165, 664 A.2d 69-70.
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text. See also Horn, 185 F. Supp.
2d at 538-53.
129. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 552 n.39.
130. See supra notes 78, 126-27 and accompanying text.
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We note with some caution ... that, by taking judicial notice
of the reliability of HGN testing and technique, the appellate
court had relieved the State of its burden of establishing the
reliability of the test at trial. We acknowledge that we, in takingjudicial notice of the reliability of the test ... are likewise
relieving the State of that burden. We shall, nevertheless,
take judicial notice that HGN testing, a scientific test, is sufficiently reliable and generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. We do so considering the great weight of
scientific support in the literature and in light of its adoption
in most other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue.
To do otherwise at this stage in the development of the science would leave to individual courts within the twenty-three
jurisdictions of this state (and the various courts and judges
within each jurisdiction) to determine, on a case-by-case basis, the scientific reliability of the test. In each of the various
jurisdictions, the determination of the reliability and acceptability of such evidence would depend upon the competence, energy, and schedules (and even the budgets) of the
various prosecutors throughout the State in obtaining, and
producing the attendance of experts at the thousands of trials involving alcohol related offenses in which HGN testing is
sought to be admitted. Disparate results and decisions might
result in many instances, not from the actual scientific reliability of the tests themselves, but from the differing abilities
and resources of prosecutors and the availability of witnesses
from the scientific community. 131
In so stating, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals eschewed the
defendant's right to a fair trial by holding that the tests admitted
against him are reliable and test what they purport to test. 132 In so
doing, the court favored prosecutors, by helping them constrain their
budgets and lightening their schedules.
B.

Horn's Response to the Maryland Approach

The concerns of the Schultz court are indeed valid ones. Developing a simple test that facilitates an officer's ability to detect drunk driving, as well as punishing those guilty of the offense efficiently and
inexpensively, are logical and important goals of a court. Magistrate
Grimm agreed, writing, "The practical truth of [the Schultz court's]
reasoning cannot be denied. . .. [I] t is highly desirable to have available a simple, inexpensive, and reliable test that can be administered
by police officers on the road, which would facilitate a prompt and
inexpensive trial." 133
131. Schultz, 106 Md. App. at 173-74, 664 A.2d at 74.
132. See id.
133. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
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Magistrate Grimm, correctly, did not base his decision on these factors of efficiency and convenience, but on the constitutional guarantee of a fair trail. 134 He wrote:
What cannot be lost in the process, however, is the requirement that the trial be a fair one and that the sum of the
evidence introduced against the defendant must be sufficiently probative to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Expedient as it may be for courts to take judicial notice of
scientific or technical matters to resolve the crush of DWI/
DUI cases, this cannot be done in the face of legitimate challenges to the reliability and accuracy of the tests sought to be
judicially noticed. 135
The goal of ensuring that every defendant appearing against the State
be provided with a fair trial should be given higher priority than setting standards of uniformity and efficiency-standards which make it
easier for prosecutors to make their case against those defendants.
While the application of the Rule 702/ Daubert/Kumho Tire standard
may require a more searching examination of the reliability of scientific and technical testimony, adoption of that standard is not required for Maryland courts to correctly decide the admissibility of
field sobriety tests. 136 Obviously, Maryland courts are required to follow the Maryland Rules of Evidence, and may therefore be precluded
from abandoning the Frye/Reed standard. 137 Adopting the federal approach, however, is not a prerequisite for Maryland courts to reach
the correct result. Maryland courts need to reexamine the taking of
judicial notice of the reliability of field sobriety tests. In fact, if the
evidence introduced in Hom were available to a court applying the
Frye/Reed standard, it is likely that the Standardized Field Sobriety
Tests would not be found reliable, and therefore subject to limitations
similar to those established by Magistrate Grimm in Hom.

134. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State").
135. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 550-51. Magistrate Grimm also recognized the fact
that, if taking judicial notice of the reliability of the tests serves to preserve
limited prosecutorial resources, the burden of refuting their admissibility
will fall on defendants who will likely have even fewer resources at their
disposal to challenge the tests. Id. at 550 n.36.
136. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
137. See MD. R. 5-702. The Committee note states: "This Rule is not intended to
overrule Reed v. State and other cases adopting the principles enunciated in
Frye v. United States. The required scientific foundation for the admission of
novel scientific techniques or principles is left to development through case
law. Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." Id. (citations
omitted).
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The Standardized Field Sobriety Tests Do Not Satisfy the Frye/Reed
General Acceptance Standard

A look at Magistrate Grimm's rationale in Horn shows not only that
the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests failed to satisfy the federal evidentiary standard, but also that the Frye/Reed standard is likely not
met. 138 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, therefore, erred in
Schultz by taking judicial notice of the reliability of the Standardized
Field Sobriety Tests.
Maryland Rule 5-201(b), which governs what courts may take judicial notice of, reads, "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."139
Perhaps in 1995, when the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
decided Schultz, the existing research led to the conclusion that the
field sobriety tests were reliable. However, testimonial evidence from
Horn refutes the reliability of these tests to such an extent that reliability no longer deserves judicial notice. 140 The fact remains, as well,
that the Schultz court did not even consider (or at least cite to) any of
the scientific studies regarding the tests and their reliability.141
Instead of engaging in independent research and forming its own
conclusions, the court, relying on a nine-year-old case, based its decision on the fact that other courts had accepted the tests as reliable. 142
The case the Schultz court relied upon was State v. Superior Court, 143
decided by the Supreme Court of Arizona in 1986. 144 In that case, the
court wrote, "Although the publications [indicating the reliability of
HGN testing] are not voluminous, they have been before the relevant
communities a considerable period of time for any opposing views to
have surfaced."145
138. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
139. MD. R. 5-201 (b) (emphasis added). See also supra note 81-82 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 97-120, 124 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 81-82, 123 and accompanying text.
142. See Schultz, 106 Md. App. at 157, 664 A.2d at 66 (stating that "[t]he admissibility of the results of HGN testing has been challenged in some foreign
jurisdictions for failing to satisfy the Frye standard (or the standard adopted
by that jurisdiction for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence)"). The court noted State v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d
171 (1986), as an early case in which the test was unsuccessfully challenged.
Id.
143. 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz. 1986).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 181. The sources the Supreme Court of Arizona utilized in its decision can be found in appendices to the opinion at 182-84. This quoted
passage seems to indicate that the court encountered little or no opposing
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The Schultz court, writing in 1995, based their acceptance of HGN
testing as reliable upon research from 1986. 14fi Judicial notice relieves
the prosecution of its burden of proving the reliability and admissibility of the test results, even if evidence indicating the unreliability of
the test is available. That research may still have been valid when the
Schultz court was writing, but the testimony presented in Horn certainly calls these studies, and thus the reliability of the test, into
question.
Under the Frye/Reed standard, a method must have gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community to be considered reliable. 147 However, based on expert testimony in Horn, particularly that
of Spurgeon Cole, Ph.D.,148 one can see that Standardized Field Sobriety Tests probably do not meet this standard. 149 Dr. Cole's testimony
first challenged the validity of the tests, which is a component of general acceptance. 150 His criticism focuses on the validity of the WAT
and OLS tests. 151
Looking at the reasons for the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests'
failure under the federal standard can be instructive in showing why
the general acceptance standard is also not satisfied. When evaluating
whether the tests had been subjected to peer review, one of the
Daubert factors, 152 Cole stated, "[I] t is difficult to see how the NHTSA
could claim that the FST is accepted in the scientific community,
when results of studies on the validation of the FST have never appeared in a scientific peer reviewed journal, which is a basic requirement for acceptance by the scientific community."153

146.
147.
148.

149.

150.
151.
152.
153.

views, which, in light of Hom and many other cases, obviously is not the
case.
See generally id.
See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540 (2002). Cole is a Professor Emeritus of
Psychology at Clemson University and author of several articles on SFSTs.
See id. at 539-40. See also http://www.c1emson.edu/psych/facuIty.html(last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
Not meeting the Frye/Reed standard would not render the tests and their
results inadmissible, but it would subject them to Hom-like limitations.
See Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 540. Dr. Cole stated in the Defendant's Memorandum that the SFSTs "must be held to the same standards the scientific
community would expect of any valid test of behavior." ld.
ld.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 541. Dr. Cole concluded his testimony:
Because of its widespread use, the FST battery has been assumed to
be a reliable and valid predictor of driving impairment. NHTSA
has done little to dispel that assumption .... The FST battery to be
valid must discriminate accurately between the impaired and nonimpaired driver. NHTSA's own research on that issue ... has not
been subjected to peer review by the scientific community. In addition, a careful reading of the reports themselves provides support
for the inadequacy of the FST battery.
ld. at 541-42.
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Because the reliability of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests has
not been subjected to peer review, the concept has not gained general
acceptance of the scientific community, making it unreliable even
under a Frye/Reed analysis. 154
A number of people within the relevant scientific community have
expressed doubts as to the reliability of the HGN tests, showing a lack
of general acceptance of the test's reliability. For example, in addition to Dr. Cole, three other experts offered testimony for the defendant in Hom. 155 An examination of similar case law reveals several
other courts have found Standardized Field Sobriety Tests unreliable
indicators of intoxication. 156 Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland erroneously took judicial notice of the reliability of the
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests under the Frye/Reed general acceptance standard.
D.

Treatment in Other Jurisdictions

Courts in jurisdictions using the Frye test have found the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible. For
example, in Young v. City of Brookhaven, 157 the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the HGN test failed the Frye analysis, as it had not
gained acceptance in the scientific community.158
It remains to be seen what would happen if Maryland courts reexamined the reliability of the HGN test. One possibility is that, after
doing so, the court would reach the same conclusion.This, however,
seems unlikely, assuming the examining court would actually analyze
the existing research and correctly conclude that the results of HGN
154. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
155. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 539. They are: Yale Caplan, Ph.D., the former
chief toxicologist for the State of Maryland and former scientific director of
the Maryland Alcohol Testing Program; Harold P. Brull, a licensed psychologist; and Joel Wiesen, Ph.D., an industrial psychologist and "independent
consultant in the field of development and validation of human performance tests." Id.
156. See generally State v. Garrett, 811 P.2d 488 (Idaho 1991) (holding HGN
alone not enough to show intoxication); State v. Chastain, 960 P.2d 756
(Kan. 1998) (holding HGN was not an accepted scientific test); Young v.
City of Brookhaven, 693 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1997) (holding the HGN test
had not been accepted by the scientific community and HGN is only admissible for probable cause purposes); Duffy v. Dir. of Revenue, 966 S.W.2d
372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding HGN was not administered correctly so
the result was excluded from evidence); State v. Torres, 976 P.2d 20 (N.M.
1999) (holding that the State must show the reliability of the HGN test in
order for it to be admitted into evidence).
157. 693 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1997).
158. Id. at 1360-61. The Young court went even farther than the Horn court did,
holding that HGN test results were only admissible at a probable cause
hearing, and not admissible at all at trial, stating that "[h]owever, the HGN
test can still be used to prove probable cause to arrest and administer the
intoxilyzer or blood test. This is the only allowable use for the test results."
Id. at 1361.
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testing have been called into question. The reliability of the tests have
been refuted to the point that one can no longer maintain they meet
the Frye/Reed standard of general acceptance within the scientific
community.
One indicia as to how Maryland courts would rule is to examine
how other courts, utilizing the Frye standard, have held regarding the
reliability of field sobriety testing. 159 One such court, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, ruled that the test results were not reliable because the Frye standard was not satisfied, and held the tests were only
admissible to prove probable cause existed, and completely inadmissible for any other purpose. 160
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania also ruled that the results of an
HGN test were entirely precluded from being admitted into evidence
in Commonwealth v. Apollo.161 In that trial, the State presented one expert who testified as to the reliability of HGN testing as an indicator of
intoxication. 162 The court held that this testimony did not meet the
general acceptance requirement of Fry; 63 because it was based in part
upon the expert's personal observations and views, and the trial court
had been confronted with evidence that indicated that the tests were
not reliable. 164
Faced with the same issue, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, utilizing
the Frye standard, reached a conclusion similar to that of the Horn
court. 165 In State v. Baue, the Nebraska court ruled that the Frye test
was satisfied, but limited the purpose for which the results of HGN
testing could be admitted into evidence to establishing that the defendant may have been intoxicated. 166 The court went on to state that
159. The discussion here will center around the Frye standard, as this is the
method of evaluating scientific evidence currently used by Maryland (and
many other states) courts, and in light of the language of the Committee
note to MD. R. 5-702. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
160. See Young, 693 So. 2d at 1360-61 (Miss. 1997). See also supra notes 140-41
and accompanying text. The Young court did not explain the reasoning
behind its holding that the tests were unreliable.
161. 603 A.2d 1023 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
162. [d. at 1027. The expert was a behavioral optometrist who evaluated eye
health and visual performance. [d.
163. Frye was adopted as the applicable standard by Pennsylvania state courts in
Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977). See Apollo, 603 A.2d at
1026.
164. Apollo, 603 A.2d at 1028. The court concluded: "Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the lower court abused its discretion when it
precluded the admission at trial of any evidence concerning the administration to appellant of the HGN test or of the results of that test." [d.
165. State v. Baue, 607 N.W.2d 191 (Neb. 2000).
166. [d. at 204. The court wrote:
[W]e hold that the HGN field sobriety test meets the Frye standard
for acceptance in the relevant scientific communities, and when
the test is given in cortiunction with other field sobriety tests, the
results are admissible for the limited purpose of establishing that a
person has an impairment which may be caused by alcohol.
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while the results of HGN testing are relevant, the results of the test are
not enough to prove that a defendant is guilty of driving under the
influence of akohol. 167 In State v. Chastain,168 the Supreme Court of
Kansas considered expert testimony,169 and still concluded that HGN
testing did not satisfy the Frye standard. 170
In light of the jurisdictions that apply the Frye standard and have
either concluded that HGN testing does not meet the standard, or
have limited the purposes for which the test could be used, it is evident that the issue should be reexamined by Maryland courts. Horn
revealed a plethora of evidence that casts doubt upon the reliability of
the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests in general, and the HGN test
specifically.l71 Considering this testimony, it is difficult to continue to
recognize the reliability of the tests and their results. It is also difficult
to understand how Maryland courts can ignore the existing research,
relieving the state of its burden of proving the reliability of questionable science, by taking judicial notice of the reliability of the tests.
E.

How Should Maryland State Courts Treat the Standardized Field Sobriety
Tests When it Comes to Admitting Their Results into Evidence?

Because of the thorough analysis of Magistrate Grimm in Horn,
which considered all of the relevant scientific research available, one
can only reach the conclusion that a standard employing similar limitations on the testimony regarding a defendant's performance on a
field sobriety test is the correct one. Properly conducted Standardized
Field Sobriety Tests can be used to determine whether probable cause
existed to charge a driver with DWI or DUI, but may not be used to
prove a specific BAC. 172 A court may take judicial notice of the connection between HGN and intoxication, but the defense should be
given the opportunity to point out that this relationship is by no
means exclusive. 173 Finally, an arresting officer may offer lay opinion
testimony of first hand observations of the defendant taking the tests,
admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication, but may not use
conclusory language such as "fail" or "standardized clues" while testifying. 174 Only when similar limitations are placed upon the admissibility of the test results in Maryland state courts will defendants accused
of DWI or DUI be ensured the fair trial that they are entitled to.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
960 P.2d 756 (Kan. 1998).
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
Chastain, 960 P.2d at 761 (stating that the court was "not satisfied that such
testing has achieved general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community") .
See supra notes 85-120 and accompanying text.
Ham, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 532-34.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

Drunk driving is a very serious problem in the United States taday.175 The role of the courts in correcting this problem is to see that
those guilty of driving while intoxicated are punished for their actions. In achieving this goal, courts must apply the proper evidentiary
standard when determining the admissibility of field sobriety tests.
Maryland and federal courts have reached two different conclusions
as to the admissibility of these tests.
Regardless of which standard is applied, the holding of United States
v. Hom-that the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests cannot be used to
prove a specific BAC, or even as direct evidence of intoxication, but
only as circumstantial evidence of intoxication-is correct. 176 This
type of evidence is subject to even further limitations. l77 The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, in Schultz v. State, chose to ignore studies
that have disputed the accuracy and reliability of Standardized Field
Sobriety Tests by taking judicial notice of their accuracy.178 Because
of the shaky footing upon which judicial notice was taken in Schultz,
the conclusion that the reliability of the Standardized Field Sobriety
Tests has reached "general acceptance" within the scientific community is faulty, and Maryland courts should adopt an approach similar
to that in United States v. Hom.
Rick M. Grams

175.
176.
177.
178.

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
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notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
notes 85-117 and accompanying text.
note 80 and accompanying text.

